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The traditional exception to the welfare reducing character of protectionism is based on
the optimum tariff argument. If in addition the   market power can be traced back to
control of a necessary,  cero substitution natural resource type input, then the
corresponding trade tax  and the shadow price  of the resource  are on  common ground,
eventually the former is also an instrument for charging the latter. In the political
economy context  such an export tax is also a device for nationalizing the income stream
the scenario promises; but also, once  this revenue takes over a significant fraction of
fiscal income   the country’s Treasury may turn into a conservative force  impeding tax
innovations dictated by dwindling monopoly power.  Specially so if government comes to
display an  agency type of behavior and the revenue reductions to be derived from  the
adaptation of the tariff to changing demand conditions concentrate in the present,
meanwhile expected  benefits of such an action extend into the future.
Based  on a simple  analytical  framework  and  exploring  the  issue  with a  set  of
simulations, the optimality of the export tax on nitrates is evaluated  for its complete
lifespan  extending over  half a century.  Its  nil capacity  for  adapting  to  changing
conditions  is  then  interpreted in  terms  of  the  assumed  incentive  structure  of
governments,  but recognizing the inherent difficulties in predicting  future market power
and therefore of  tax design.
In the 1870
th in face of the rapidly expanding international demand for nitrates,
concentration in its southern province of a high proportion of world’s total natural
deposits and thirdly underdeveloped technology in artificially produced nitrate, Peruvian
government puts into practice a set of policies aimed  at capturing potential monopoly
rents to be derived from this situation.
To meet the challenge Peruvian nitrate industry was nationalized financing
future payment with specially designed certificates.  Since geographic concentration of
deposits did not coincided completely with its own jurisdictional area, it additionally
bought establishments located in Bolivian provinces, also obtaining from its government
an agreement restricting further licensing of nitrate land.  These measures plus public2 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
control over access to nitrate mining lands in its own region should have given Peru
access to sizable profits, but it was too late.
The Pacific War started in 1879  when the Bolivian government intended to
apply a special tax on the only nitrate producing establishment not under some kind of
Peruvian regulation, a firm owned by Chileans.  In the early 1880 and  once  authority
over the nitrate region was completed the Chilean government faced the same
opportunity, that is appropriation  of rents stemming from controlled  exploitation of the
natural resource.
1
The government had a clear advantage in its claim.  It not only exercised
military control over the whole territory containing natural deposits, but any initiative in
this same direction by industry itself was debilitated by recent  experience with
nationalization.  Last but no least, war effort exercised a severe demand on Chilean
fiscal accounts, a hole nitrate rents could nicely fill and the burden of the enterprise
would no longer fall only on its constituency.
Reflection on previous experience with nationalization might have been
important when designing the specific policy instrument for capturing those rents.  The
Peruvian administration had run into management difficulties and faced financial
problems when intending to pay the bill for nationalization.  The first problem was partly
overcome by returning administration of the extracting and refining establishments to
former proprietors.  Financial difficulties on the other hand can be traced back to
lukewarm participation of the international banking industry in policy financing.
Those reflections plus retaliation possibilities of various types and other
political issues related to the international power game, should have been present when
Chile decided in 1880 to impose a tariff equivalent to 18.55 grams of gold per ton of
nitrate exports, a tax to be repealed only after generating public revenue for half a
century.
2  The adopted solution at once started to generate a generous flow of resources
into governments purse.
                                                                
1 Participation in world’s  total supply  was  above 90 per cent in 1880
2  In July 1879 the  Chilean government experimented with a 10 per cent tax on net profits (we are not sure if
this policy was finally put into practice).  The issue was debated in Parliament and basically three possible
policies were discussed: (i)cero tax (here the argument was that Chile’s reason for war had been its discomfort
with the tax applied by Bolivia),  (ii)tax on profits;  (iii)a specific tax (proposed by Zorobabel Rodriguez, an
economist who had been a student of Courcelle Seneuil, a French economist who spent some years in Chile in
the 1860’s)DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 3
The policy mix adopted by the Chilean government was  based on three pillars.
First, the previously mentioned export tariff.  Second, the establishment of a privately
owned industry that hopefully would supply the product at marginal cost.  And third, a
distinct deviation from general mining law, a policy following earlier Peruvian
initiatives and whose objective was to establish fiscal control over all potential mining
land which had not been already conceded, restricting further entrance into industry
unless authorized
3.
In relation to the export tax different lines of economic thought intermingle.  It
is a tax on trade and therefore points directly towards the issue of protectionism and its
rich literature.  On the other hand, as Bickerdike (1906) already mentioned (cited by
Scitowsky, 1987) this particular tax may act as a substitute for cartel building and
eventually generate a beneficial impact on the welfare of the country applying it,
provided  the  underlying market power actually exists.
Public revenue generated by such an export tax compares favorably with other
excises raising the corresponding fiscal income; an increase in monopoly rents to be
obtained from this source lowers the required domestic taxation and thru it eventual
distortions.   Therefore and for a budget of a given size, its welfare enhancing character
implied by the international transfer is complemented by a fall in total cost of public
funds, the latter including both, distortions and administrative collection costs.
In what follows we concentrate on the first issue: the optimality –non
optimality– of the export tariff, that is its capacity for  monopoly rent extraction and in
particular on its constancy (in gold but not in general purchasing power  as the reader
may soon see) in face of a rapidly declining participation in nitrates supply (fertilizer)
4,
                                                                                                                                                               
In September 1879 the law established a specific export tax of 0,40 Chilean pesos (equivalent to 38d);  finally,
in October 1880 the law established the tax of $1,6 (equivalent to38 pence (d) per metric quintal  with a gold
content of 18.55 gr.).  It could be paid either in these unit (“peso fuerte”) or current paper money (government
establishing the relation).  Initially exports south of the paralell 24 were exempted from tax payment for a two
year period starting in September 1879.  But the latter only accounted for a very small fraction of total supply.
See Alejandro Silva de la Fuente in Semana del Salitre Abril 1926, p.472
3 General mining regulation consists in a  more or less free access  policy. Search and exclusive extraction
rights  are easily obtained  paying a relatively low annual fee.
4  “The challenge came from two chemical substitutes, by product nitrogen and synthetic nitrogen.  By product
nitrogen in its most common form, sulphate of ammonia, was derived from coal distillation in the manufacture
of coke and artificial gas.  Sulphate of ammonia had been produced commercially since 1858 and by 1914 it
was a serious competitor in the world nitrogen market.  The war encouraged further development and
production of the second alternative, synthetic nitrogen.  Germany initially relied on synthetics to compensate
for the interdiction of Chilean supplies by the Allied blockade and then set up protective barriers for its
domestic insdustry in the postwar years.  Synthetics were produced by capturing nitrogen out of the air using
one of three methods: the arc, cynamide or Haber-Bosch process.  The Haber-Bosch process, which produced4 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
5. The next section briefly discusses the export tariff in a general setting of protectionism
and cost of public revenue.  Section two brings a few stylized facts on Chilean nitrates.
In three the methodology based on a comparison between optimum and effective tax
rates is exposed and the respective simulations are  presented.  Four extends the
analytical scenario considering the additional possibility of an private participation in
monopoly profits.  In final remarks we hypothesize on diverse long run implications of
nitrate’s tariff  maintenance in the 1920’s.
1. PROTECTIONISM AND THE COST OF PUBLIC REVENUE
In the face of the reputation protectionism now enjoys in the literature it is
surprising that  many countries  depended heavily  on trade taxes in their public finances.
For example, in the 18
th and 19
th Century, U.S. Federal budget trade taxes constitute a
very high fraction of total federal income (Wallis, 2000) and even around the middle of
the 20
th Century in many developing countries public income stemming from these taxes
were still important (Goode, Lent and Ohja, 1966 and Lewis Jr., 1963).
As long as there are any benefits to be derived from trade the fundamental
requirement for obtaining public revenue by means of trade taxes rests on the
jurisdictional division of space.  Revenue so obtained will depend on the size of the trade
base, hence on GDP and the countries openness.  One should keep in mind that from a
strict revenue perspective the level of tariffs, as in most taxes, is restricted by Laffer type
considerations.  Therefore tariffs inspired in public revenue objectives should be in a
"reasonable" range, prohibitive tariffs being useless.
However most of the discussion about import and export based tariffs centers
on other topics, even if the fiscal revenue consequences are the most visible and easily
quantifiable.  A simple ordering of these issues distinguishes various lines of thought not
all of which will be mentioned here.  Following traditional tax theory, one insists on the
costs  generated  by  the  respective  “ excess  burden”,  since  trade  tariffs  only  tax a
                                                                                                                                                               
synthetic ammonia by combining nitrogen and hydrogen  at high temperatures, rapidly became the single
largest source of non Chilean nitrogen in the late 1920’s and 1930’s.” O’Brien (1989), pp.122-159, 137
5 See Peltzman (1977), Caves (1989), Schmalense (1989), and Sutton (1997).  A recent revision can be found
in Sapelli (2001) Concentration (participation) should not be understood mechanically and a priori as a proxy
for monopoly power,
 5 but it constitutes one of the elements shaping the demand elasticity faced by the
monopolist –Chile’s government- and should be taken into account.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 5
proportion of total consumption.  This line of  thought tends to associate  tariffs  with
protectionism and  therefore negative effects on national wealth, even so its potentialities
in distributional  matters  might be  acknowledged.  Trade  based  taxes  generate  net
distortions when compared to more general excises, as for example a sales tax  on the
product and not only on its traded fraction (Corden, 1974).  It is precisely the existence
of alternatives what is behind economists distaste for protectionism
6.
A complementary line of thought emphasizes the possibility of  an tariff
producing  real income for the nation levying it, proposing  that terms of trade are
endogenous to tariff design, and that this tax may constitute a policy instrument in the
gamble for world rent distribution, Bickerdike, 1906 (cited by Scitowsky, 1987). Seen
from another angle this view fits into the fashion of pigouvian taxation aiming at the
capture of  external effects.
Scitowsky underlines the similarity between this view of tariffs and, on the
other hand, monopoly and monopsony theory.  Tariffs with this character, "have been
imposed almost exclusively on primary products and only in countries where those are
grown by many small growers under competitive conditions" (pp. 588)
7.
The topic we explore in the following pages is a case study of the Chilean
government nitrate tax management, covering the years 1880 to 1930.  In 1880 as
                                                                
6 An extension of this line of thought centering on excess burden and inefficient substitutions induced by
tariffs, stretches this view towards a more general concept of cost of public funds.  When raising one dollar of
public revenues, distortions generate an excess burden, meaning that the cost to citizens is (1 + l) times the
revenues raised. Even considering taxes of a more general character then tariffs, the magnitude of  l can be
quite large.  See, for example: Ballard, Charles, John Shoven and John Walley (1985).
Following this line of thought, one would argue, see for example Corden, op cit., that what needs to be
minimized is the total cost of public funds, that is (l + g), where g measures resources used by the government
to enforce tax laws, expressed in terms of tax revenues.  Both l and g depend on the composition, but also on
the level of government expenditures relative to GNP.  At certain times, stages of development or convergence
degrees, the g from trade taxes might be lower then the enforcement cost coefficients for more general tributes,
like those associated to general sales taxes or even general income taxes (Corden, 1974).  For example, the
control of borders, specially when there are few ports, might be easier and therefore the associated enforcement
costs might perhaps be cheaper, then those associated with taxes levied on many individual tax payers
distributed over a broad spatial spectrum of the domestic territory.
We recognize that our argument runs exclusively in terms of that part of l which has to be paid by the
government, ignoring costs incurred by private agents.  Finally, a subtle issue, we also do not consider, is the
change over time of these two components, that is l and g.
As a result, the overall burden of trade taxes might, in certain cases, be lower than that of taxes with a more
general base.  Therefore, a scenario where a heavy dependence of public revenue on trade based taxes might
qualify as efficient, should be one where the total cost of public funds, that is (l + g), is lower for these taxes
then for alternatives sources.
7 He further points out that industrial countries, exporters of manufactures, do not apply export duties because
monopoly positions are exploited directly by large producers.  This, he adds explains Britains 19
th Century
doctrine of free trade:  monopoly and monopsony positions in world market were already efficiently exploited
by large export producers and by large wholesale import merchants.6 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
already mentioned thanks to the territorial conquest undertaken by the Republic, a large
fraction of world production of nitrates concentrated in the Northern regions of the
country.  Domestic consumption of the product was relatively insignificant and
producers, as we will argue, were competitive during most of the period.
Was the level of that tax optimum?  Leaving aside the issue of enforcement
costs, a tariff is optimal if it maximizes some measure of national welfare for the tariff
levying country.  Behind this view  of the tax a variant of the market failure hypothesis
can be found, one proposing that if many producers operate under competitive
conditions it takes government intervention to exert national monopoly power; in other
words  it is assumed that industry cannot exploit it by itself (Pomery, 1987).  Cartel
building requires a collective decision among different producers, a cooperation which
according to this view  may not come about spontaneously since competition among
independent producers generates an equilibrium where export price equals marginal cost.
Prohibitive transaction costs would make the  private solution  unlikely, unstable or of
short duration.
A variant of the above considers that government intervention through an
export or import tax is a way of nationalizing profits to be derived from a potential,
socially efficient, cartel.  In this view, government makes use of its powers to inhibit
private cartel formation and extracts the monopoly (or monopsony) rent in its benefit.  In
particular in the case of poor and labor intensive  countries, it may  also be  necessary to
consider that even if private cartel formation is not prohibitive, there is no guarantee that
its outcome would engross national welfare since such an organization could easily turn
out  being of foreign ownership.  In this perspective the monopoly tariff and
complemented by measures favoring competitive industry, could be seen as an
alternative to either outright nationalization of industry or to a sort of discriminatory
corporate tax capable of capturing those rents.
2.  CHILEAN NITRATES: STYLIZED FACTS
The extraction of the natural resource is a surface mining and in those years
labor intensive activity. After arriving at the establishment and once refined the naturalDOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 7
nitrate (Chile nitrate)
8 is transported to port.  When loading the product on ship the
export tax is charged; price data (price free aside ship) includes all the above stages of
production including the  latter.
Freight to foreign market plus commercial and financial services by importers
constitute the final stages. These costs plus the above FAS price define the London
Price.  The analysis of monopoly power and tax optimality will  center on the demand –
the demand faced by Chile’s government-implied by the  above FAS price. 
9
In relation to the stylized facts of industry’s development between 1880 and
1930 two phases, approximately divided by World War I, will be distinguished (see
tables and graphs of the Appendix). In the first production increased relatively steadily,
while thereafter it more or less stagnated but with profound periodical ups and downs
(Graph NºA1).  The total employment pattern in the industry followed that of production
relatively closely (Graph NºA2).  Prices, showing a like behavior, nevertheless begun to
fluctuate a few years before the War (Graph NºA3), affecting export values in the same
sense (Graph NºA4).
  10  In a similar fashion, standard deviations of production, price,
and value of production, were relatively low until World War I, or a few years before
depending on the variable, but since then and until 1930, very large deviations took
place (Graph NºA5).  Moreover, the number of Chilean Nitrate production plants, the
inverse of a proxy for industry concentration, suggests that around 1914 a break in
industry’s  development style  took place (Graph NºA6).  Finally, Chile’s share in World
production declined during the whole 1880-1930 period, from over 90 per cent at the
beginning to 20 per cent at the end of the 1920s (Graph NºA7)
11,  but again it is during
the war years where a clear discrete fall can be seen, from about 50 per cent in 1914 to
32 per cent in 1920.  In 1927 the share again decreases sharply, this time by about a
third.
                                                                
8   Pure content changed from 42 to 20 per cent between 1890 and 1910.  O’Brien (1989), p.132
9  Also included in section four is a minor reflection on the eventual monopoly power in the last stage, but it
does not go beyond description of long run tendencies.
10   “with at least three fourths of output used as fertilizer, the importance of the level of farm income for the
nitrate industry can hardly be exaggerated.  When prices of farm products rose, the desire to obtain maximum
yields created a strong demand for nitrates; but in the periods of decline, a cutback in fertilizer purchases ...
The nitrate industry was particularly sensitive to ... sugar beet cultivation in Western Europe ... ”  Brown, J.R.
(1963), p.231,  based on Lamer (1957)
11  World production is here identified with total nitrate production (azoe).8 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
Competition faced by Chilean nitrates stiffens through time.  The London price
ratio of Chilean nitrate over sulphate of ammonia, the early competitor, shows a sharp
decline in the early 1880’s but from there on and up to World War I no definitive up or
downward tendency may be identified.  But starting with the war and over the 1920’s
large fluctuations characterize this ratio.
Sulphate of ammonia, and specially since the 1910’s is far from being the only
competitor (O’Brien 1989, footnote above), and therefore its price may not register all
the competitive pressure.  In Table 1 the average yearly change in world production of
all types of azoe is divided into quantities supplied by Chile and the rest of producers,
that is sulphate of ammonia and other synthetic goods.
Table 1
AZOE: Average Yearly Production Change, Chile and the Rest 1880-1930
(Selected periods, tons.)
Chile Rest By Product Synthetic
1880-1900 7.500 4.749
1901-1903 16.667 0 4.733
1904-1913 20.000 27.300 18.830 9.443
1914-1922 -61.111 18.778 1.311 33.200
1923-1926 59.000 98.075 18.325 92.225
1927-1929 34.133 229.333 33.100 206.300
1930-1939 -28.310 131.400 2.788* 120.525*
Sources: Ministerio de Hacienda Sección Salitre Antecedentes sobre la Industria Salitrera (1925);
Bertrand: La crisis del salitre (1910); Bertrand: Estudio sobre la Industria y comercio... (1915);
Ministerio de  Hacienda: La industria del salitre en Chile (1934); DGE Mineria 1945; O’Brien
(1989), p.138.
*Average 1930-1937.
Already by 1904 competitors begin to expand production more rapidly than
Chile and this in an increasing trend.  The evolution of this measure coincides with early
warnings of market observers (Bertrand 1910, for example)  pointing towards the
growing competition faced by Chile, that is a relative decrease in its market power.
Table 2 on the other hand brings a general outlook on the dimensions reached
by export tax revenues stemming from nitrates for selected years .DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 9
Table 2












1879 4,1 4,0 51,2
1880 6,4 24,5 35,9
1900 9,7 55,9 31,9
1913 10,1 51,1 37,1
1920 6,9 49,3 21,1
1925 13,1 25,7 21,1
1930 15,4 14,9 31,3
1935 17,2 3,7 30,0
(*) Nitrate tax is not included.
Source: Jofré, Lüders and Wagner (2000)
3. CHILE´S NITRATE MONOPOLY POWER AND THE EXPORT TAX:
FIRST PERHAPS TOO LITTLE AND LATER TOO MUCH?
In this section we first describe the analytical framework to measure  Chile´s
nitrate monopoly power over time and then applying  it to evaluate the character of the
export tax on nitrates.
3.1. Conceptual framework
Government is seen as the cartel manager, the agency in charge of capturing
potential monopoly profit. Domestic consumption is insignificant and the main
instrument at its disposal for capturing this  flow   is a tax per unit of exported nitrate.
The tribute is enforced at cero marginal cost and there are no possibilities for product
transfers from the domestic to the  international market which could  avoid its payment .
In this view nitrate is generated by a relatively large number of independent and
competitive producers, synthesizing  into an industry wide marginal cost function. From
the perspective of the producer-exporter  the tax simply represents an additional
necessary payment for reaching consumers in the rest of the world.  From governments
point of view the optimum export tax is equal to the profit maximizing difference
between the monopoly price to be paid by foreign  consumers  and industry’s marginal
cost. Our  exercise centers on the determination of the optimum wedge, then  comparing10 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
it with the effective margin, that is tax really charged. Later on, section four, the scenario
opens up and the possibility of a second stage monopolist  and private participation in
monopoly profits are evaluated.
The underlying political economy model is crude, mainly assuming  that
government is only interested in maximizing  fiscal revenue  from this source. It does
not deny that optimum tariff will enhance disposable income, transferring to the country
some fraction of what otherwise could have taken the form of foreign consumer surplus.
In graph 1, right side,  industry’s marginal cost, Sc’, and marginal revenue, R’,
are  obtained from nitrate demand faced by Chile, D
Ch.  The export  quantity  identified
when equalizing both concepts   illuminates the fiscal revenue maximizing mark-up, T*,
as the difference between marginal cost and the corresponding  price for consumers.   On
the other hand Sc’ represents the sum over individual firms (establishments) marginal
cost, c´.  Net price, equal to monopoly profit maximizing price, P* minus T* is then the
guide to output determination, that is price faced at producer  establishment level.
Heterogeneity in industry is illustrated in the graph by the presence of three
type of producers: a,  b and g.  Under this tax scheme and meanwhile  a and b are
registering positive profits, establishment  g is the marginal producer. These  intra
marginal profits, not to be confused with monopoly revenue which here is captured
exclusively by government,  may stand for quite a range of situations, non market
pricing of  inputs comes here easily to mind; for example, nitrate content of minerals or
aspects related to establishments  location, as distance from ports and access to water
supply (a critical factor in the desert).
Another way for expressing the same idea would have average cost equal to net
price for all establishments, case where all resources would be priced at the
corresponding shadow wage price.  Finally the eventual difference among short and long
run average cost due to the existence of fixed factors in the former period will play an
important role, but its presentation is delayed until final discussion.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 11
Graph 1
Optimum export tax with a competitive industry
Over time the demand may  increase and schedule  D
Ch displaces eastwards.
Expansion of existing firms and or new entrances may push Sc’ in the same direction,
increasing production, exports and public revenue, perhaps without mayor changes in the
relevant marginal cost of industry.
A situation of “oversupply”, employing the expression in relation to a long run
equilibrium supply, might be illustrated by a positive displacement of Sc’ without an
equivalent increase in demand, D
Ch.  For industry this means that net price is somehow
below a net expected price (not explicitly identified), and therefore profits of
establishments are slim or even negative.  As already mentioned the nitrate industry
seems to have faced this type of situation in different occasions; sometimes it tried to
administer them through producer combinations (see section 4).
Tax being by far the main policy instrument it  is not the only one at
governments disposal, and it also decides    the quantity of mining fields to be  licensed.
But the  incidence of this instrument  is again conditioned by independent private
decisions.  The demand for additional mining field licenses may reflect the intention to
expand output immediately, but it may also be only an option visualizing possible future
product expansions in a context where not only the demand faced by industry might be
unstable but also licensing behavior followed  by government might be discretionary.
Therefore in our analysis this option will be ignored;  we may add that revenue derived
from this source has been negligible, at least when compared to tax income.12 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
From 1880 onwards  the  specific tax measured in gold units, T (without supra
script, the effective tax) was applied,   therefore the question to be evaluated period after
period collapses into the comparison of T* with T.  Turning again to Graph 1, if the tax
T exceeds T*, or falls short of it , in both cases fiscal revenue stemming directly from
nitrates should not be at its theoretical maximum.  For example, if T<T*, the difference
means that fiscal revenue would have been higher with a smaller export level, - the profit
maximizing Q
Ch*- and a tax equal to T*.  Since T is fixed a priori by law and is not a
consequence of a maximization process conditioned by the yearly outlook, the
possibility of a difference between actual and optimum tax is a  very real issue.
The challenge facing Congress (public authority) when choosing the export tax
level was no minor task.  It is our hypothesis that the objective function
12 of these
authorities can be understood as maximization of public revenue stemming from nitrates,
but one needs to add that for political and economic reasons the yearly redefinition of the
tax should be prohibitive.
13  The tax horizon is really not part of the discussion: for all
practical purposes once fixed it cannot be changed, unless of course something really
dramatic happens. In this scenario the experimental method of tax fixing, that is finding
maximum profits through a process of successive approximations was a non available
policy instrument.
Two aspects should be kept in mind.  The first as already mentioned is that the
tax is fixed a priori by law and is not the consequence of a yearly maximization process
conditioned by the respective outlook.  The second one centers on the particular
conditions posed by Graph 1 where a lineal demand curve implies a constantly changing
elasticity and therefore marginal revenue.  Optimum mark-up T* is unique and could be
easily established provided the required information were available, the demand curve
itself.  But this is not the case in our simulations and as will be seen in the next section
                                                                
12  A discussion of tax approval in a public choice setting is here avoided.  From a strictly rational point of
view there should not have been much opposition: the tax was supposed to be paid by the rest of the world, it
was also an opportunity to lower domestic taxes, the excise on tobacco being the main example. Of course
some representatives related to existent producers and railroad interests, either Chilean or foreign, exercised
some opposition.
13 In a counterfactual scenario authorities would have enough commercial and analytical capacity and could
have found the optimum export tax for each year.  But in practice they were not given the discretionary  power
for doing it.  Of course it is also possible that these optimizing capacities of the public bureaucracy was
recognized as inexistent, be it for technical and informational reasons or be it because of eventual agency
problem conflicts, and that precisely for this reason the tax was fixed by law and not changed.  Implicit in this
discussion favoring a stable tax is the issue of the possible incidence of unexpected tax changes on industry’s
investment.  These institutional dimension of the nitrate export tax are not examined in the present paper.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 13
our procedure is of a more speculative character, and only a set of plausible elasticities
are constructed.  This procedure conditions the interpretation of our results (section 3.3).
3.2. Estimation and Data
(i)  Optimum Tax
The traditional profit maximizing  condition, marginal revenue equals marginal
cost,
P (1+(1/h)) = c’
defines  optimum price , P*, as
P* = c’ [1/(1+(1/h))]
Therefore, the optimum tax (T*) is simply the difference between P* and cost,
and the tax efficiency indicator to be used is T/T*,  effective over optimum export tax.
Two inputs are required for the determination of T*: cost and elasticity.  The
former, given the above competitive equilibrium scenario, is simply understood  being
equal to P-T, that is price minus tax, both effectively observed.  The determination of the
second one is explained below.
(ii)  Demand Elasticity
The demand elasticity faced by Chile is obtained thru  an traditional excess
demand formulation:
hch =  (Qt/Qch)*hwd – (Qr/Qch)*xr
where
Qt. = World (total) production (consumption)
Qch = Chile’s exports (we ignore the insignificant difference between production and
exports)
Qr  = competitor’s production14 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
This demand elasticity faced by government  ,  hch, combines market
participation ratios (Table A1) with a set of a priori values for the world demand
elasticity for nitrates (hwd) and for the supply elasticity of competitors(xr).
Simulations are supposed to generate an elasticity for each particular year,
therefore and specially in the case of xr they constitute short run or year specific values.
In the longer run, that is when taking into account the reaction to price changes over
more extended periods, xr   eventually may  turn out being quite elastic, accounting for
expansions and innovations by actual and potential  competitors, a possibility to be taken
into account when it comes to the  evaluation of yearly results obtained.
The fourteen a priori selected elasticity  combinations for  generating hch are the
following:
Table 3
World Demand Elasticity for Nitrates and Competitors Supply Elasticity:
A priori estimates
hwd xr hwd xr
-0,5 3 -0,2 1
-1 1 -0,2 0,7
-0,7 1 0 1
-1 0 -1 3
-0,5 1 -1 2
-0,7 0,2 -1,5 1
-0,5 0,5 -2 1
Due to its unreasonable marginal cost implication any elasticity equal to one or
less in absolute value, that is inelastic, is  eliminated .  The rest is synthesized into four
series, each registering an elasticity for every year:
14
                                                                
14  Direct econometric estimations of Chilean demand elasticity did not generate acceptable results.  But a
reasonable estimate for World demand elasticity could be obtained from the 1880-World War I period.  The
estimated equation is the following (all variables in logs):











Table 3 above was re-estimated with the same inputs for competitors supply elasticity and participation rates
but now taking the econometric estimation for World demand elasticity, that is –1.15.  In relation to the
Chilean elasticities estimates (1) and (4) above, and with the exception of elasticity (1) where this new
procedure generates significantly higher values, the three others show little difference with simulations in the
first four columns of Table A.2.  They are somewhat lower up to the first half of the period and definitively a
little after World War I (range from –20 per cent up to +15 per cent, depending on the elasticity).DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 15
(1) The least elastic
(2) The average once maximum and minimum values  have been eliminated
(3) Average of (2) and (4)
(4) The most elastic estimate
These four series for the  constructed demand elasticity faced by Chile and their
respective Lerner coefficients can be found in Table A2.
(iii)  Data
Tax (T) is the effective nitrate export tax as reported by fiscal revenue accounts.
It coincides more or less perfectly with the tax as specified by the code once expressed
in the same unit (1995 US dollars).  Price (P) is the quoted price aside ship in Chilean
port, also in 1995 dollars
15.  The quantity measure (Q) refers to exports (tons.).  There
are periods where production and exports do not coincide, stocks in Chile accounting for
the difference.
16  Finally, cost follows Graph 1 and is taken to be the difference between
the above price and tax; it is identified as C2.
(iv)  Optimum values
As already mentioned, P* is constructed with two inputs: cost and the
respective Lerner mark-up coefficient (L).  Hence P*= C2·L, and therefore optimum tax
is T* = P* - C2.
The evaluation of tax optimality starts comparing the effective and optimal tax
ratios T/T*.  This is the first and in our opinion the most important result.  Analysis then
extends in the direction of revenue implications of tax differences.  Effective revenue is
compared with potential monopoly profits, T*Q*.  Rent maximizing quantity,  Q*, is
calculated through the expression Q*= Q + dQ.  The latter element is taken to be:
dQ = hch (Q/P) dP
where
                                                                
15  Not all nitrate is actually sold in Chile and British companies tended to be more vertically integrated.  We
assume that the quoted price is also the relevant shadow price for the latter exports.16 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
dP = (P* - P)
When P* turns out to be above P, then the optimum quantity Q* should be less
than Q, the actual export.  Since Q and P are necessarily positive, the negative sign of
the demand elasticity determines the required negative dQ.
When comparing the  effective and the optimum revenue it is necessary to keep
in mind that, as mentioned in 3.1, calculations are based on constructed elasticities.  In
particular when calculating Q*, the elasticity implicit in both, Q and Q* is forced to be
the same, opening up the possibility of an effective revenue near to or even larger than
the theoretical optimum  (once lack of precision of discrete calculations is
acknowledged).  No exogenous test for the constructed elasticity is applied and therefore
a constant elasticity in the range Q-Q* cannot be ruled out a fortiori, neither confirmed.
In other words, a constant demand elasticity implies constant marginal revenue,
and when assuming scale independent unit costs as we do, it gives rise to a range of
profit maximizing export levels.  Therefore the particular  elasticity assumption opens up
the possibility for similarity, eventually identity, among  effective and optimum public
revenue from nitrates, even if T* „ T.
3.3. Results
The ratio of real to optimal nitrate export tax for each of  the above constructed
demand elasticity faced by  Chile is shown in the initial four columns of Table A3.  The
following set of four columns in the same Table depicts the ratios of real to optimum
exports, Q/Q*.
The ratio of T/T* for the least elastic value (1) is characterized by enormous
differences, implying that the real tax should have been   ten, twenty or even more times
higher, implying an absurd corollary: Q*, the optimum export volume turns out negative
in most years.  Our interpretation is that the assumed elasticity is too small and not
useful for evaluating the optimality issue.
                                                                                                                                                               
16  Sales to consumers, mainly agriculture, and Chilean exports are not necessarily equal on a year by year
basis.  Data on stocks of Chilean nitrate in Europe is only available for a few more recent years.  Due to this
limitation our calculations are based on exports and not strictly on consumption.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 17
Calculations based on elasticity four, the most elastic are the only ones
generating positive Q/Q* ratios for the whole period.  Elasticity two and also three
generate positive Q/Q* ratios, except for early years.  The tax was established in 1880,
and assuming some rationality and reasonable information by the tax fixers, it is
precisely in those years where an acceptable fit should be expected.  
17  Therefore at least
for those years only ratios based on elasticity four answers our main question; for later
years the T/T* ratios based on elasticity 2 and 3 cannot be eliminated from discussion.
The last four columns of Table A3 take the two measures together and compare
actual and optimum fiscal revenue.  The first aspect to be noticed when centering
attention only on the most elastic case (4), underlines that even if deviations between
actual and optimum quantities are significant, real and optimum revenue tend to be
similar. When   taking this figures without further consideration the optimum monopoly
quantity in practice turns out  being a   broad range of quantities and not a unique point.
In others words and referring again to Graph 1, marginal revenue and cost are more or
less equal for a range of quantities.  But as discussed in the last section, the result needs
careful interpretation because of its implicit conditioning by basic methodological
procedures, in particular the constant elasticity assumption when calculating Q* (and
constant cost).
In Table A4 the first four columns show the same ratios of effective to optimum
revenue, but now imposing the additional condition that the coefficient stays within the
range:  0<coefficient<1,09   The lower limit simply eliminates all negative values,
because of their implicit negative optimum export quantity.  The upper limit on the other
hand is more discretionary, leaving aside cases in which effective revenue is 10 per cent
and more higher than estimated under maximizing conditions.  The argument behind this
restriction is empirical based on the notion that an excessive ratio of effective over
optimal revenue puts the simulated values under critical light.  But, what is excessive?
Even if discretionary we postulate that an estimation error of less than 10 per cent is
tolerable.  Of course a purist’s approach may want to reduce it to a still lower limit,
eliminating all cases above unity.
                                                                
17 The tax was approved by parliament but in our understanding its level was heavily influenced by the
proposition of the executive. Before that the issue was studied by a special committee.18 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
The last set of four columns in Table A4 reproduces only indicators of the first
group surviving the test, therefore all T/T* ratios not complying with the above
condition disappear.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 19
When accepting the revenue consequences as established by ratio TQ/T*Q* and
also the above criterion of positive coefficients below the ten per cent difference, then a
value of T/T* above unity literally implies that effective tax could have been reduced
without paying a revenue slice.  But even if the conclusion is conditional to the
acceptance of this criteria, the important aspect to notice is the rising trend which
remains for the T/T* at least for the cases of elasticities 3 and 4.  This upward trend in
later years will be interpreted as a policy opportunity for tax reduction without loss of
public revenue ( but more on this , later in section 6).  Additionally, a lowering of the tax
within a reasonable range might also have helped industry’s competitive position.
4. PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN MONOPOLY RENTS.  DID IT EXIST?
In section 3 the assumed competitive environment translates into an  industry
supply where cost is identified by the observed price minus real  tax and the government
receives the  monopoly rent.  This scenario will  now be  modified so  that  additional
possibilities may be evaluated. On the one hand a broader participation scheme  in the
above   monopoly rent will be  allowed for, and  on the other the `possibility of a second
stage monopoly is  introduced.
4.1. Private participation in the one stage monopoly context?
Nitrate historians inform  about different privately induced  cartel agreements
(“combinaciones”) each lasting for a short period of years.  Agreements are said to have
been either  ineffective in obtaining reductions of  production  or  if  registering  some
success, did not work for  long.  Taken strictly these reports do not imply  permanent
private participation in those monopoly rents, but  the possibility is explored in  what
follows.
The evaluation of this broader participation schemes in monopoly rents  was
facilitated by cost data found when searching for nitrate facts, a data series stretching20 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
from 1880 up to 1925.
18 In this way price may be decomposed into: tax, cost and a
residual and once the latter is interpreted as profit a first step for a broader participation
scheme emerges.
Of course we cannot establish a priori for what profits (residual) so obtained
would exactly stand for, but the general  hypothesis guiding analysis is that all or part of
it may be classified as an industry participation in the Chilean monopoly power.
19 In
what follows different interpretations of this cost data are used for discussing the idea
explored in section three.  In total eight different concepts for this eventual  private
participation are defined for simulation purposes.
20
For each of these eight cost definitions the corresponding monopoly price is
calculated based on the same set of Lerner coefficients already mentioned (Table A2).
The respective monopoly mark-up, M*, that is P* minus the specific cost definition, then
                                                                
18  Ministry of Finance as reported by the publication  “Semana del salitre celebrada en Santiago de Chile Abril
de 1926”, Santiago, La Ilustración, p. 900.  It is an ad hoc serie and our pressumption is that it does not come
from industry studies and is only a series prepared for 1926 meeting.
For an overall impression on the factors sustaining the long period tendency, cost per ton was regressed on a
scale indicator, average production per establishment (oficina), plus a tendency or time element.  Both
coefficients are significant (R
2=66 per cent).  The time series elasticity so obtained for the 1894-1924 period is
–0,696; therefore, a 10 per cent scale increase lowed cost per ton around 7 per cent.  The tendency coefficient
is also negative an equal to –0,0176.
Historians of the nitrate in Chile underline two mayor technological changes, presumably with a significant
impact: the adoption of the Shanks refining system around 1880 and the innovations –mechanization-
introduced by the Guggenheims since the late twenties.  The above data presumably excludes both.
19  There are two basic sources for cost data.  One is a survey prepared by Fernandez(1978) which we take
from Reyes (1994).  The second one was elaborated by the  Ministry of Finance (1925) for the 1880-1924
period. In general, with the exception of 1907, a year characterized by heavy strikes, differences between
sources are not exceptional, the second being an average slightly higher.  This latter was preferred given its
broader extension.
20  Experiments take into account nine different definitions for the monopoly component of profits (G).
(1)  G=0, the case reported in section 3.  Here cost is simply price less tax.
(2)  Based on the same cost concept of (1) but taking tendency values; deviations of actual and
tendency values are considered to be private monopoly rents.
(3)  Based on cost figures of Ministry of Finance; decomposes G so obtained into a tendency
component GT and a residual.  GT is interpreted to be cost, some sort of capital cost and the
residual GN is industry participation in monopoly profits (the latter is negative in some years).
(4)  The same as (3) but here GN is part of cost and GT is assumed to correspond to monopoly profit
participation by industry.
(5)  Cost is the sum of the tendency values of cost as identified by the Ministry of Finance and the
corresponding profits.  Here the industry participation in monopoly profit is Price minus Tax
minus the above cost.
(6)  Directly takes the  Ministry of Finances figures to be total cost and all profits so obtained are
considered as industry’s participation in monopoly rent.
(7)  The same as (6) except that now cost is the tendency value of Ministry of Finance data.
(8)  Cost is Ministry of Finance figures plus a fraction of the residual estimated as a risk
compensation element based on standard deviation of nitrate’s price.
(9)  The same as (8) but here the risk compensation factor included as cost bases on the standard
deviation of quantity exported.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 21
distributes into tax and private monopoly profit participation (GP).  Therefore M* = (TP
+ GP)*.
Notice that this scenario does not generate a measure for the revenue
maximizing tax as in section 3; it only determines the optimum mark-up M* but not its
distribution into tax and private profit.  Additionally, government is also restricted by the
specifications of the tax law of the early 1880’s, having no capacity for yearly
negotiations, therefore TP = T and GP absorbs fluctuations in M* (in a few cases GP
turns out being negative).
It should also be noticed that the exercise simply assumes some sort of private
participation in monopoly rents and then explores its consequences, but it does not
provide an explicit justification for the existence of this participation.
21
4.1.1.  Results
As in section 3 and using  the same set of elasticities the effective  monopoly
returns are calculated; are visualizing them   as the  effective tax plus the corresponding
industry participation magnitude in  relation to optimum  monopoly  mark-up,  that  is
(T+G)Q/(T+G)*Q*.  Additionally  we  identify  (T+G)/(T+G)*,  that  is  the actual  to
optimum mark-up, for those  ratios within a  range running from  0 up to 1.09.
Only from 1915 onwards and for all cost definitions is this ratio accepted by the
above test in the case of simulations based on the least elastic demand (h1), what  brings
us to dismiss indicators developed under this elasticity assumption.
On the other hand for the most elastic demand (h4) assumption it is possible to
observe mark-up ratios since 1880, but more than half disappear after 1907.  The
difficulty with the surviving indicators stretching over most of the fifty year period, is
that their usually high values, above unity suggest that already in the 1880’s and 1890’s
total mark-up tended to be excessive in a systematic fashion, a situation difficult to
believe for the early years.
Mark-up ratios computed with intermediate elasticity values (h2 and h3) and
similar to the most elastic case (h4), show half of the indicators disappearing between
                                                                
21  There are different candidates for explaining private participation; cartel agreements already mentioned
being one; maybe government licensing of new fields could be another one.  The railroad Company is  said to
have exercised market power (due to the government concession scheme) specially in the first decades.  But
this should not show up in the above GP since all of our cost definitions already account for this freight.22 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
the years 1908 and 1912 and from then onwards.  The rest, those covering a more
substantial part of the total period register more observations in the h3 case than in the
h2 case.  Both elasticities generate indicators nearer to an interpretation where in the
initial years mark-up is somewhat below optimum, but turning definitively excessive in
the 1920; but some already point towards an excessive margin in the 1890’s.
It seems clear to us that this ratios might be criticized for proposing irrational
behavior by private participants: an excessive margin and considering the tax as given
would reflect an  non optimizing adjustment.  Abstaining from this limitation, these
results do not argue themselves in favor or against the hypothesis of a broader
participation scheme.  Rather they show that if the analytical scenario allows for private
participation, then the general impression obtained in section 3 is still valid: may be too
little was charged in the early years, but it  definitively became  too large  later on,  a
consistent finding for all surviving indicators for the 1920’s.
4.2. Second Stage Monopoly?
Price distributes into cost, profit and tax in highly varying proportions; for
example, tax shares calculated over the FAS price go from a maximum of 47 per cent to
a minimum of 12 per cent (see Appendix, Table A1) following no precise time trend.
But since consumption localizes mainly in Europe and USA the above price, used in all
previous calculations, only represents the cost of one bundle of inputs of the product
finally consumed , the difference being sea freight, trade and financial services.
22
Public debate with respect to nitrate policy considered this particular aspect to
be a weak feature in government control over nitrate business. The particular question
for our present purpose is the extent to which this margin, that is London-FAS price
23,
                                                                
22  Nitrate establishments localized in northern provinces were owned by proprietors of different nationalities
including Chilean ones (proportions varied much through the period, in part only of a spurious reflection of the
introduction of corporate taxes in Great Britain). Loosely speaking we may say that British owned
establishments exported directly, but the rest really were selling the product in Chile.
23  Both London and FAS prices are yearly averages.  At least in London’s case, it corresponds to a yearly
average, with clearly different maximum and minimum observations.  We ignore how the averages were
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obeys exclusively to cost or if it also contains some element of market power.
When regressing the above margin against time, a secular annual decrease of
1,5 per cent is obtained.  And when subdividing the margin into the freight component
and a residual, they show an annual decrease of 1,9 per cent and 1,3 per cent,
respectively.
24  The decrease in freights over this period of 36 years should not constitute
a surprise, after all important technological changes and innovations characterize
transport  per sea in those years.
We do not see an easy and a priori cost based explanation for the decreasing
tendency shown by the residual (London Price – FAS Price – Freight).  A possibility is
that trade and financial costs, inputs which presumably account for this residual, are
more or less constant over time and therefore the possibility of a decreasing monopoly
power in hands of wholesale importers of the product should be taken into account.  This
possibility will not be further explored.
5. WELFARE IMPLICATIONS: A CLOSER LOOK
For three or three and a half decades the export tariff on nitrates  generated
income transfers from the rest of the world and  in Chile’s favor,   the statement being
conditioned by the underlying counterfactual. Initially - section three- it  is represented
by the competitive outcome, the discussion centering  directly on the optimality of the
tariff.  Later on -section four-  the possibility of some participation by foreign factors is
explored, something our analysis neither proves or disproves; therefore this constitutes
an aspect to be taken into account when discussing the plausibility of the above
counterfactual.  Its exact dimension might require  further discussion, but it is our
impression  that  the main conclusion about the existence of  significant transfers from
the rest of the world firmly holds.
                                                                
24  The three regressions used data for the 1882-1915 period and the results are presented in the next table
(t-statistic between brackets):
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Jumping directly from transfers to welfare implications smacks of partial or
incomplete analysis and for avoiding it at least two potential issues should be discussed.
Retaliation by trade partners is one aspect; the second  assumes that welfare associates
with goods  consumed and given no unique relation running from foreign transfers to the
level and composition of output, decisions pertaining public sectors expenditure may
play  a central role.  The present section discusses   both briefly.
i) Retaliation by importers
Trade partner reactions to interventions in the free market for goods and
resources constitute a possible danger to any tariff measure, and retaliation may express
itself in many different  ways:  tariffs, quotas, an unsolicited visit of the fleet, etc.
The possibility of retaliation to nitrate’s export tax seems absent   from  Chilean
public policy discussions. But  this is only   an impression and not a conclusion flowing
from  rigorous historical analysis, something the  authors feel  not prepared to realize;
recognizing this  in what follows the  above  statement is taken  only as a  working
hypothesis.
25  It is only in the late twenties and specially with the Great Depression that
regulatory reactions of trade partners start to inhibit nitrate  exports,  but and as our
discussion suggests in those years  Chile already was nearer to a price taker than fixer
position and  therefore its capacity for  obtaining   transfers thru  trade taxes is quite
limited, probably inexistent
The overall transfer from trade partners provoked by the export tax includes,  (i)
effective tax receipts by the Chilean government plus (ii) the respective  Harberger
triangle,
26 once free competitive world trade is taken as the pertinent counterfactual.
Total excise so defined when compared to a rough estimate of total  agricultural GDP of
                                                                
25  For example, a revision of the correspondence of the UK Foreign Office and its Chilean representatives, and
also internal letters of large British trade houses may possibly change this view.
26  The standard expression for the excessive charge, for example Stiglitz (1988, Ch.18) when assuming elastic
marginal cost conditions, is given by 0.5*t
2*P*Q*h, where t stands for the equivalent ad  valorem tax
calculated over net supply price (P), Q is quantity, and h is demand elasticity.  We estimated the magnitude of
the excessive charge for the year 1900; P is equivalent to Chilean marginal cost (FAS price minus tax, T) and
Q to Chilean exports divided by market participation, therefore a proxy for world volume. For price and tax
we take the corresponding averages for the 1895-1905 period.  Our procedure assumes that all foreign
production generates excessive charge from the point of view of world consumers. The total excise so
obtained, that is excessive charge plus revenue so defined –chilean tax receipts plus the foreign production
effect- gives a total of 477million 1995 US dollars. When comparing to a rough estimate of the main importing
countries agricultural sector GDP this total excise is equal to one fifth of I%.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 25
main importers (our sample includes only UK, USA, Germany, Spain and France),
gives a cost equal to one fifth of one percent.
27
There  may also have  been other  issues explaining the  apparent  absence  of
retaliation, about their relevance we can only speculate. One  of them derives from  the
heavy presence of foreign ownership in nitrate manufacture.  Since any retaliation could
quite  possibly have  had a  negative  incidence  on these  interests,  industry’s property
structure  may  have  protected  Chile’s  monopoly  power,  at  least in  the  short  run.
Secondly international creditors were  involved  in industry itself, but also maintained
obligations issued by the  Chilean government. Assuming   that  retaliation in response
to the export tax  might have generated difficulties for debt servicing capacity, the inter
relations so obtained could have been a sort of stabilizing element in the scenario.
ii)  Optimal export tariff and Chilean welfare.
Once nitrate fields came under Chilean jurisdiction and government starts
extracting those  rents, public revenue   expands rapidly;  in this context   one obvious
question refers to  its translation into effective welfare. Judging the situation   on a
simple normative  scenario where citizens preferences are to be taken into account, and
where the demand behavior of the different goods consumed is assumed to be normal,
such an income shock would divide among state and citizens.  With two composite
goods entering citizens utility function –let us say one private one public- the revenue
expansion distributes into both goods (Bradford and Oates 1971).
An empirical impression can be obtained when Chilean fiscal expenditure is
taken  as representing  the public good, and  GDP minus fiscal expenditure as the private
one.  Table 5 proportions  income elasticities for these goods and for  two periods,
before the nitrate episode and for three decades from 1880 onwards. According to these
results nitrate revenues open up new or formerly hidden dimensions of the Chilean
public choice process.
                                                                
27  As explained in the previous footnote total excise represents a negligible fraction of production. What is
more surprising is the implicit cost of public funds; when taking the role of a world wide planer, each dollar of
Chilean revenue so obtained costs the world 37 cents.
But of course, Chilean government was not accountable for this cost; without retaliation it was irrelevant for its
constituency.26 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
Table 5
Private and Public Good: Income Elasticities
(Pre and post 1880) 
28
Private Good Public Good
1840-1880 1.04 0.78
1880-1910 0.85 2.24
The following Graph on the other hand , registers actual figures from 1870 up
to 1890 and from 1880 onwards incorporates projections based on first periods
elasticities
29. Income expansion obtained from nitrates translates mostly into public
sectors expansion, resembling a distribution governed by the  flypaper effect as it is
known in the literature referring to transfers from central to local governments  (“money
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The  above  exercise  contrasts the  empirical  with  an  assumed  or  historical
income elasticity and  therefore the observed difference neither proves or disproves the
validity of the respective assumption. Its main objective  is to  call  attention onto an
                                                                
28  Elasticities are obtained in a single variable relationship between the respective good and GDP, using first
differences.  The data source is Braun and others (2000).  Specially in the first period the private good as
computed is a very important component of GDP, hence the estimate of public good elasticity.
29 The above empirical finding is opposed to some historical literature claiming  that governments lost the
golden opportunity for the country not using these resources directly for fostering development; the  least to be
said is that fiscal expenditure expansions are far from negligible. But it might be that the criticism rests on
expenditure decisions within the budget not referring to the income distribution decision between public and
private goods,   a question we leave here.
30  For a recent survey applied to local public finance, where the local distribution of central government
transfers are examined, see Hines and Thaler (1995)DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 27
unexplored issue, that is a discussion of the nitrate episode with reference to a broad
public choice scenario in both periods, one where options and restrictions are properly
identified in the choice setting.  For example, the understanding of nitrate’s incidence on
the public budget and   finally on welfare should  benefit from  its   discussion on a
general scenario where public expenditure in specific  items are allowed a more active
role.  Defense  or  eventually  infrastructure  might after  all be  somehow  linked   to
territorial expansion, much more at least  then an elasticity comparison permits; in other
words  the  underlying  technology,  that  is  the  production  function  of  nitrates
incorporation into Chilean jurisdiction is eventually a more complex issue, a restriction
not to be ignored.  But extensions like this we cannot examine further.
6. FINAL REMARKS
For half a century   nitrate exports provided Chile’s government  with a
generous income stream; from 1880 and up to 1930, discounted at the 10% rate, the
stock value of the public revenue flow derived from this base is equivalent to 65.7% of
1880’s GDP.
31  The evolution of this flow of export tax receipts is far from uniform,
being highly irregular from World War I onwards, and with the exception of a few years
much below pre-war levels.
a) Tax incidence
The policy instrument thru which the potential revenue flow materializes, the
specific export tax measured in gold units,  stayed constant over the whole period in
spite of  the    dwindling Chilean market power. Our main objective has been  the
evaluation of the optimality of this tariff design, that is  the extent to which it coincided
with the monopoly profit maximizing mark-up thru time, and in this sense clear signals
of a fundamental change can be observed  around World War I, sooner or later
depending on the specific simulation;  in particular in the 1920’s  the coefficient of the
effective  export tariff in relation to optimum mark up is significantly higher then its pre
war level.   Nevertheless the capacity of the export tax for raising state revenue is still
                                                                
31  The discounted flow refers to export tariff receipts.  Import tariffs charged on the corresponding imports are
not included.28 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
important; for example, in the boom years 1927-29 public income stemming from nitrate
still added up to 77 per cent of the historical maximum reached  in 1911-13.
As mentioned the high level reached in those years by the effective to
monopoly maximizing mark-up can be seen as a normative  indicator favoring tax
change. But now  it is time for discussing the consequence on public revenue of an
eventual tax reduction.
Referring to this question various aspects should be taken into consideration. To
begin with optimum tariff simulations are specifically determined for each year, but  on
the other hand, the same elasticity is employed when calculating the ratio of  effective to
optimum revenue, in particular for obtaining the  revenue maximizing quantity, Q*. In
this sense the similarity between both revenues, specially in the case of simulations 3
and 4, is a consequence of this procedure but not necessarily does  it constitute a
reasonable prediction of effective revenue in face of an tariff reduction. Constant
elasticity demand curves not being  guaranteed  a priori, such a prediction would require
an independent indicator for eventual elasticity changes. This we do not provide and
therefore  our estimates for optimum revenue do not answer such a question, an aspect to
be taken into account in the following discussion.
In a long run perspective and to the extent that world price is still  influenced by
the Chilean tax,
32 one concludes that a lower tax would have been followed by a smaller
price. As long as this is valid, in other words as long as  the country keeps some market
power and additionally expansions of production by third parties are characterized by an
non zero  supply elasticity, then Chile’s long run participation in total output will be
endogenous to its previous export tax level, a higher present tax implying a lower future
share.  Taking these considerations together the tax change comes under a more
favorable light: when lowering its level in year t, its impact on fiscal receipts of the same
year cannot be predicted by our calculations but a shrinking revenue is quite possible.
On the other hand and for future periods such a change might generate a larger share in
total world output and eventually even  more fiscal income.  This simple reasoning does
not provide any clue to possible lags and timing, and the overall evaluation of an
                                                                
32  A simple regression of FAS price with effective nitrate export tax for 1881 up to 1910 generates a positive
coefficient for the tax.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 29
eventual tax change should have required additional information, one being the long run
supply elasticity for foreign production.
As already said our estimations suggest a rapidly falling monopoly power from
World War I onwards, but  and given the inherent limitation in our methodology
specially with respect to the  foreign supply  elasticity, the possibility of little or non
market power left in 1920 cannot be ignored.
33  This brings us to the third dimension of
such a tax change, that is  the effective market situation in those years. A correct
identification is not provided and  only a hypothetical scenario is briefly discussed.
Hereunder suppose  that  the 1920’s already offered a  sort of competitive  price facing
scenario to Chilean nitrates, what then is the   incidence of the export tax?
Fixed, that is nitrate specific assets behind establishment’s production functions
make this tax possible in the short period. Nevertheless in a steady state equilibrium
rents to be derived from those assets  take the form of necessary income for  long run
survival. In such a context, therefore, the export tax effectively charged in the 1920’s
should have inhibited Chilean production and exports would disappear completely in the
long run.
Steady state is only an assumption for describing a case of extreme tax
incidence, the real 1920’s surely offered deviations from this hypothetical scenario, and
eventually  exogenous technological innovation or changes in factor prices and of
intermediate goods changes may have been  helpful to industry.
Industry spokesman   emphasized the excessive character of the tax, specially in
the 1920’s;  in itself and as Adam Smith taught us, such expressions  not necessarily
constitute unbiased opinion. But there is more and  early reflections of a government
observer of the nitrate market, already in the first decade of 1900 confirm the presence
of stiffer foreign competition (Bertrand as quoted by Reyes 1994, pp.15-21).  In the
second half of the 1920’s it is government itself who  seems to recognize a problem
                                                                
33  The econometric estimation of World demand elasticity (see footnote 15) already points to ward somewhat
higher elasticity estimates than those underlying our calculations for the 1920’s.30 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
when starting to return a fraction of revenue to industry.
34  It also began to prepare a new
tax code and finally in 1930 the specific tax was repealed in favor of a tax on capital;
also a mayor reorganization imposed a centralized sales agency.
The hypothetical tax cut  in year t, say in the 1920’s, would probably have
meant more or less similar production but less fiscal income in the same year; its long
run incidence on both variables  remaining an open question.  Such reasoning must
surely have been part of government reflections when it came to tax innovation.
Henceforth policy change must have been taken as a rather risky adventure, where quite
visible and negative immediate consequences could not have been turned around by
eventually positive long run effects, and this before introducing any consideration with
respect to governments rather reduced time horizons.
In the 1920’s, may be somewhat earlier, the different governments seem to have
found themselves in  an ever increasing dilemma: (i) lower the export tax and face quite
possibly a simultaneous  revenue decrease, but thru it also obtain an increment of the
probability of larger- compared to business as usual- future incomes from this source;
(ii) on the other hand, stick to the existing tax  and at least obtain the “sure” thing now (a
way of saying since exports in that decade were highly variable).  “Larger” future
income to be derived from a tax cut is expected and its presently perceived  magnitude,
once taking into account the declining evolution of market participation experienced by
the country, could have been rather slim. Adding to this  the agency problem which is
said to characterize governments in general when it comes to discount future income , it
is not surprising that the tax was maintained.
(b) The Great Depression: a defining moment for nitrate exports?
The incidence of the Great Depression of the 1930 is put under a new light by
our findings. By many accounts, see for example Cepal (1949), the depression is really a
                                                                
34  Devolution by the “Caja de Fomento  Salitrero” accounted for the following percentages of revenues
stemming from nitrates export tax (our data on revenues reported in this paper are therefore gross revenues):
1927, 2 percent; 1928, 21 per cent; 1929, 26 per cent.  Source: Rep. de Chile Ministerio de Hacienda,  Of.
Presupuesto, Folleto No. 27 Noviembre 1930, “Compañia de Salitre de Chile”, p.8.  Devolution based on law
4.144, July 27
th 1927, whose aim was to save the specific export tax established in 1880, probably under the
assumption that the crisis industry was living was not permanent.  Devolution itself had more of year by year
discretionary character and is therefore more similar to sudden unexpected capital gains than to industry
income to be included in project evaluation.  The above reflection is included in the introduction to the law
project creating the “Compañia Salitrera Nacional de Chile” in 1930, when also the specific export tax is
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defining moment in Chile’s development, limiting its access to world markets and
pushing the country towards inward-looking policies.  The depression is seen and
correctly we think, as a worldwide and completely exogenous phenomena imposing
itself  on this small and export oriented  country. But  and this is the point we want to
emphasize  the statement should not be turned around and simply understood as the
unique cause behind export contraction.  The fall in exports we argue was additionally
conditioned by the domestic nitrate policy applied earlier.  Our findings not only
underline the convenience of a broader scenario for the discussion of the depression,
they also suggests a qualitative answer: domestic public decisions or better absence of
decisions were quite relevant in nitrate’s collapse.
35  The outbreak of the depression
probably helped in fixing the exact time point of the phenomena, but its more or less
definitive character has much deeper roots.
(c)  Reflections on tax stability
For about three decades from 1880 onwards did the application of the export tax
generate quite satisfactory results, capturing rents and providing fiscal revenue.  If the
tax was the best suited policy instrument available for exploiting the opportunity offered
by world demand and control of supply conditions is debatable.  One may think of
alternatives offering more capacity of adaptation to changing market conditions, but tax
asessment and enforcement costs in general should not be forgotten when developing
such an exercise.  Anyway even if the conclusion of such a search would bring us to
consider the nitrate tax as the best available instrument, it seems quite evident that this
inference should no longer be valid after World War I.
Remember now  that the tax was established in gold pesos, and that once
metal’s price began to change the effective tax followed it closely. Comparing the
effective tax charged with a counterfactual one fixed in real dollars at the initial 1880
level, we find the first departing markedly from the second, as it  can be seen in the
Graph A8.  Until World War I, even if non negligible fluctuations are present, the tax
stays above the 75 per cent level (of 1880).  A sharp decline follows and only in the
second half of 1920’s it  climbs back to 55 per cent of its initial level.
                                                                
35 One interesting future exercise would compare public policy towards nitrates and towards copper in the
1920’s, the latter an export good rapidly recovering after 1930 and at least initially taxed by a quite different
and more  flexible code.  But this is a subject for another study32 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
In other words, once monopoly power shows clear signs of rapid declination,
the tax adjusts accordingly. This can be seen as a lucky circumstance for tax survival,
but also as an additional variable to be taken into account when trying to understand why
government should have hesitated with tax changes.    In this sense the upward trend of
the effective tax in the 20’s  might have been an additional  factor stimulating redesign
of the tax code.
Was there an alternative tax available?  Strictly speaking this question may be
impossible to answer here, but a look at the tax treatment received by  copper, the
sharply rising export activity of  the 1920’s may throw some light on it. Reynolds (1965)
states “it is clear that taxation before 1925 was well below 5 per cent of the value of
sales” (p.226).  Income tax in large scale copper production was not collected until 1922.
In 1925 and due to advice of the Kemmerer Mission, a 6 per cent levy on profits was
added.
36
But again  the overall impression to be obtained from copper’s tax experience is
that government cannot have found in it a very solid argument for tax change in nitrates.
As so many times in Chilean development policy, change required the presence of a
really sharp depression, but it came too late.
                                                                
36 It is understood that Social Security taxes and regulations, heavily enforced in the copper sector, produced
some temporal increase in the wage bill of large copper mining (op. cit., p.228).  The latter could be considered
as a short run tax-expenditure program with redistributive effects favoring labor in the sector.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 33
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APPENDIX
Table A1
Chilean Nitrates 1880-1930: Basic Data  (US$ 1995 per ton and shares)
FAS Price London
Price






1880 547,35 775,93 172,14 146,17 101,98 87,86 12,14
1881 446,37 697,06 127,80 247,13 129,11 89,18 10,82
1882 405,85 601,07 125,86 294,42 99,23 89,41 10,59
1883 371,67 554,08 134,73 287,77 101,57 88,62 11,38
1884 388,45 518,48 153,38 230,78 79,63 85,45 14,55
1885 460,97 604,37 159,95 184,91 86,96 78,30 21,70
1886 414,88 591,06 125,44 215,17 76,89 75,50 24,50
1887 363,07 563,00 136,22 213,40 82,43 79,89 20,11
1888 389,61 575,85 153,43 182,33 87,14 78,30 21,70
1889 392,73 570,37 161,98 200,91 93,07 77,90 22,10
1890 338,76 497,14 158,40 212,01 109,74 76,66 23,34
1891 374,63 536,62 133,28 214,58 106,56 72,66 27,34
1892 432,50 579,32 173,54 198,24 67,45 68,90 31,10
1893 423,94 610,41 166,64 163,88 80,73 71,03 28,97
1894 477,76 679,73 188,25 191,07 94,15 72,31 27,69
1895 423,50 582,98 179,89 256,51 86,23 73,33 26,67
1896 459,59 589,82 198,21 196,50 75,20 70,04 29,96
1897 427,25 572,31 173,70 240,12 77,56 67,49 32,51
1898 367,14 534,87 161,44 201,39 99,53 71,38 28,62
1899 357,47 523,94 169,51 196,52 90,49 71,16 28,84
1900 356,00 516,65 160,65 219,28 101,98 70,50 29,50
1901 433,57 557,70 166,45 196,35 74,90 67,53 32,47
1902 421,26 544,83 146,23 208,36 52,30 68,62 31,38
1903 417,35 548,59 149,25 257,59 44,68 70,38 29,62
1904 462,06 590,20 149,90 218,46 49,30 68,24 31,76
1905 482,86 616,26 151,29 233,24 57,11 67,68 32,32
1906 522,84 623,68 145,93 282,86 45,69 65,42 34,58
1907 506,24 585,05 135,72 330,48 37,17 62,60 37,40
1908 458,14 560,33 141,15 173,92 40,20 61,04 38,96
1909 385,67 497,70 131,14 176,86 45,73 59,61 40,39
1910 372,95 457,27 127,97 157,19 44,31 60,31 39,69
1911 431,68 524,26 137,79 172,34 49,78 57,88 42,12
1912 440,73 549,34 128,89 159,93 65,88 55,54 44,46
1913 428,87 543,98 123,91 187,23 64,22 54,32 45,68
1914 390,98 526,17 133,98 161,60 49,56 51,58 48,42
1915 379,94 616,31 127,15 170,90 166,52 33,73 66,27
1916 342,60 704,51 103,33 153,04 250,56 41,31 58,69
1917 407,96 321,80 83,20 136,31 224,01 38,38 61,62
1918 353,41 288,56 43,65 85,97 218,04 34,86 65,14
1919 285,65 219,79 55,57 123,97 164,76 30,58 69,42
1920 405,26 252,07 55,70 100,90 43,50 31,51 68,49
1921 423,77 478,72 76,24 130,96 43,31 32,31 67,69
1922 361,99 417,19 73,45 161,49 43,12 24,04 75,96
1923 353,47 655,70 81,46 154,96 42,93 32,20 67,80
1924 362,03 501,54 81,19 158,71 42,74 35,56 64,44
1925 332,17 347,38 86,05 129,77 42,55 33,93 66,07
1926 339,57 345,62 93,23 122,59 42,36 25,67 74,33
1927 310,74 337,91 102,24 113,57 42,17 19,52 80,48
1928 303,19 298,84 93,18 122,64 41,98 27,51 72,49
1929 286,13 298,04 95,04 120,78 41,80 24,17 75,83
1930 265,89 349,45 98,55 117,26 41,61 18,37 81,63
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Table A2
Demand Elasticities and Lerner Coefficients Simulation, 1880-1930








1880 -1,14 -1,52 -1,97 -2,41 8,23 2,91 2,03 1,71
1881 -1,12 -1,47 -1,92 -2,36 9,24 3,11 2,09 1,73
1882 -1,12 -1,47 -1,91 -2,36 9,45 3,15 2,10 1,74
1883 -1,13 -1,49 -1,94 -2,39 8,79 3,02 2,06 1,72
1884 -1,10 -1,53 -2,02 -2,51 11,41 2,90 1,98 1,66
1885 -1,17 -1,74 -2,29 -2,83 6,85 2,35 1,78 1,55
1886 -1,25 -1,87 -2,42 -2,97 4,98 2,16 1,70 1,51
1887 -1,13 -1,67 -2,21 -2,76 8,82 2,49 1,82 1,57
1888 -1,17 -1,74 -2,29 -2,83 6,85 2,35 1,78 1,55
1889 -1,18 -1,76 -2,30 -2,85 6,49 2,32 1,77 1,54
1890 -1,22 -1,81 -2,36 -2,91 5,59 2,23 1,73 1,52
1891 -1,04 -1,80 -2,47 -3,13 26,92 2,25 1,68 1,47
1892 -1,11 -1,98 -2,67 -3,35 10,42 2,02 1,60 1,42
1893 -1,07 -1,88 -2,55 -3,22 15,93 2,14 1,64 1,45
1894 -1,04 -1,82 -2,48 -3,15 23,41 2,22 1,67 1,47
1895 -1,03 -1,77 -2,43 -3,09 37,62 2,29 1,70 1,48
1896 -1,09 -1,93 -2,61 -3,28 12,76 2,08 1,62 1,44
1897 -1,13 -2,06 -2,75 -3,45 8,49 1,95 1,57 1,41
1898 -1,06 -1,86 -2,53 -3,20 17,44 2,16 1,65 1,45
1899 -1,06 -1,87 -2,54 -3,22 16,43 2,15 1,65 1,45
1900 -1,08 -1,90 -2,58 -3,26 14,06 2,11 1,63 1,44
1901 -1,13 -2,05 -2,75 -3,44 8,54 1,95 1,57 1,41
1902 -1,11 -2,00 -2,68 -3,37 9,97 2,00 1,59 1,42
1903 -1,08 -1,91 -2,59 -3,26 13,70 2,10 1,63 1,44
1904 -1,12 -2,02 -2,71 -3,40 9,41 1,98 1,59 1,42
1905 -1,13 -2,05 -2,74 -3,43 8,70 1,96 1,57 1,41
1906 -1,03 -2,06 -2,82 -3,59 35,87 1,94 1,55 1,39
1907 -1,10 -2,21 -3,00 -3,79 11,26 1,83 1,50 1,36
1908 -1,14 -2,30 -3,11 -3,91 8,23 1,77 1,47 1,34
1909 -1,01 -2,27 -3,15 -4,03 76,54 1,79 1,46 1,33
1910 -1,16 -2,35 -3,16 -3,97 7,33 1,74 1,46 1,34
1911 -1,07 -2,38 -3,28 -4,18 14,64 1,73 1,44 1,31
1912 -1,16 -2,53 -3,47 -4,40 7,22 1,65 1,41 1,29
1913 -1,21 -2,61 -3,57 -4,52 5,78 1,62 1,39 1,28
1914 -1,04 -2,68 -3,75 -4,82 23,28 1,59 1,36 1,26
1915 -1,96 -4,45 -6,66 -8,86 2,04 1,29 1,18 1,13
1916 -1,42 -3,44 -5,06 -6,68 3,38 1,41 1,25 1,18
1917 -1,61 -3,79 -5,60 -7,42 2,65 1,36 1,22 1,16
1918 -1,87 -4,27 -6,37 -8,47 2,15 1,31 1,19 1,13
1919 -2,24 -5,02 -7,55 -10,08 1,80 1,25 1,15 1,11
1920 -2,16 -4,84 -7,27 -9,69 1,86 1,26 1,16 1,12
1921 -2,09 -4,69 -7,04 -9,38 1,92 1,27 1,17 1,12
1922 -3,04 -6,67 -10,16 -13,64 1,49 1,18 1,11 1,08
1923 -2,09 -4,71 -7,07 -9,42 1,91 1,27 1,16 1,12
1924 -1,81 -4,17 -6,21 -8,25 2,23 1,32 1,19 1,14
1925 -1,95 -4,42 -6,60 -8,79 2,06 1,29 1,18 1,13
1926 -2,81 -6,18 -9,38 -12,58 1,55 1,19 1,12 1,09
1927 -3,91 -8,46 -12,98 -17,49 1,34 1,13 1,08 1,06
1928 -2,57 -5,70 -8,62 -11,54 1,64 1,21 1,13 1,09
1929 -3,02 -6,63 -10,09 -13,55 1,49 1,18 1,11 1,08
1930 -4,20 -9,06 -13,92 -18,78 1,31 1,12 1,08 1,0638 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
Table A3
Tax Exports and Revenue: ratios of real to optimal, 1880-1930
Elast 1 Elast 2 Elast 3 Elast 4 Elast 1 Elast 2 Elast 3 Elast 4 Elast 1 Elast 2 Elast 3 Elast 4








1880 0,06 0,24 0,44 0,65 -0,23 -1,93 19,85 1,70 -0,01 -0,46 8,82 1,10
1881 0,05 0,19 0,37 0,55 -0,19 -1,25 -6,28 2,27 -0,01 -0,24 -2,31 1,24
1882 0,05 0,21 0,41 0,61 -0,19 -1,39 -18,35 1,88 -0,01 -0,29 -7,51 1,15
1883 0,07 0,28 0,53 0,79 -0,24 -2,59 4,06 1,30 -0,02 -0,73 2,17 1,03
1884 0,06 0,34 0,66 0,99 -0,18 -6,51 2,00 1,01 -0,01 -2,23 1,33 1,00
1885 0,09 0,39 0,68 0,97 -0,33 15,00 1,84 1,03 -0,03 5,89 1,26 1,00
1886 0,11 0,37 0,62 0,86 -0,48 16,70 2,29 1,18 -0,05 6,26 1,41 1,01
1887 0,08 0,40 0,73 1,05 -0,24 14,02 1,63 0,95 -0,02 5,65 1,19 1,00
1888 0,11 0,48 0,83 1,19 -0,37 3,87 1,28 0,85 -0,04 1,86 1,07 1,01
1889 0,13 0,53 0,92 1,30 -0,43 2,78 1,12 0,79 -0,06 1,47 1,03 1,02
1890 0,19 0,71 1,20 1,68 -0,71 1,52 0,82 0,64 -0,14 1,08 0,98 1,08
1891 0,02 0,44 0,81 1,18 -0,06 5,13 1,36 0,86 0,00 2,28 1,10 1,01
1892 0,07 0,66 1,12 1,58 -0,21 1,70 0,88 0,67 -0,01 1,12 0,98 1,06
1893 0,04 0,57 1,00 1,44 -0,12 2,27 0,99 0,72 -0,01 1,29 1,00 1,04
1894 0,03 0,53 0,96 1,40 -0,08 2,70 1,05 0,74 0,00 1,44 1,01 1,03
1895 0,02 0,57 1,06 1,54 -0,05 2,31 0,93 0,68 0,00 1,32 0,99 1,06
1896 0,06 0,70 1,22 1,73 -0,17 1,54 0,80 0,63 -0,01 1,08 0,97 1,08
1897 0,09 0,72 1,20 1,68 -0,28 1,47 0,81 0,64 -0,03 1,06 0,97 1,07
1898 0,05 0,68 1,20 1,73 -0,12 1,64 0,81 0,63 -0,01 1,11 0,97 1,08
1899 0,06 0,79 1,39 2,00 -0,14 1,32 0,70 0,57 -0,01 1,04 0,97 1,13
1900 0,06 0,74 1,30 1,85 -0,16 1,42 0,75 0,60 -0,01 1,06 0,97 1,11
1901 0,08 0,66 1,09 1,52 -0,26 1,70 0,90 0,69 -0,02 1,12 0,98 1,05
1902 0,06 0,53 0,90 1,26 -0,20 2,59 1,16 0,80 -0,01 1,37 1,04 1,02
1903 0,04 0,51 0,88 1,26 -0,13 2,99 1,18 0,81 -0,01 1,51 1,04 1,02
1904 0,06 0,49 0,82 1,15 -0,20 3,18 1,32 0,87 -0,01 1,55 1,08 1,01
1905 0,06 0,48 0,79 1,11 -0,22 3,35 1,39 0,90 -0,01 1,60 1,10 1,00
1906 0,01 0,41 0,71 1,00 -0,04 5,79 1,72 1,00 0,00 2,37 1,21 1,00
1907 0,04 0,44 0,73 1,02 -0,14 3,89 1,59 0,98 -0,01 1,73 1,16 1,00
1908 0,06 0,58 0,94 1,30 -0,23 2,05 1,08 0,78 -0,01 1,19 1,02 1,02
1909 0,01 0,65 1,11 1,56 -0,02 1,69 0,88 0,67 0,00 1,10 0,98 1,05
1910 0,08 0,70 1,13 1,55 -0,29 1,51 0,87 0,67 -0,02 1,06 0,98 1,05
1911 0,03 0,64 1,07 1,49 -0,12 1,72 0,92 0,69 0,00 1,11 0,98 1,04
1912 0,07 0,63 1,02 1,41 -0,27 1,76 0,98 0,73 -0,02 1,11 1,00 1,03
1913 0,08 0,66 1,04 1,43 -0,36 1,66 0,95 0,72 -0,03 1,09 0,99 1,03
1914 0,02 0,88 1,43 1,99 -0,07 1,15 0,67 0,55 0,00 1,01 0,96 1,09
1915 0,49 1,74 2,84 3,95 3,30 0,61 0,34 0,31 1,60 1,06 0,97 1,23
1916 0,18 1,06 1,75 2,45 -1,07 0,95 0,54 0,46 -0,20 1,00 0,94 1,12
1917 0,16 0,71 1,18 1,65 -1,28 1,45 0,81 0,63 -0,20 1,03 0,96 1,03
1918 0,12 0,46 0,76 1,05 -1,53 2,61 1,50 0,95 -0,19 1,20 1,14 1,00
1919 0,30 0,97 1,58 2,19 -59,65 1,03 0,58 0,48 -17,91 1,00 0,92 1,06
1920 0,18 0,61 1,00 1,39 -3,20 1,73 1,00 0,73 -0,59 1,06 1,00 1,01
1921 0,24 0,81 1,32 1,84 -4,99 1,25 0,71 0,57 -1,19 1,01 0,94 1,04
1922 0,52 1,44 2,33 3,22 2,32 0,71 0,39 0,34 1,21 1,02 0,90 1,11
1923 0,33 1,11 1,82 2,52 95,89 0,90 0,51 0,43 31,44 1,00 0,92 1,09
1924 0,23 0,92 1,51 2,10 -3,09 1,09 0,62 0,51 -0,72 1,00 0,93 1,07
1925 0,33 1,20 1,96 2,72 -52,84 0,84 0,47 0,41 -17,50 1,01 0,93 1,12
1926 0,68 1,96 3,17 4,38 1,55 0,55 0,30 0,27 1,06 1,07 0,94 1,20
1927 1,43 3,66 5,87 8,09 0,72 0,33 0,17 0,17 1,03 1,21 1,02 1,34
1928 0,70 2,08 3,38 4,68 1,52 0,52 0,29 0,26 1,06 1,09 0,97 1,23
1929 1,01 2,80 4,52 6,24 0,99 0,41 0,22 0,21 1,00 1,16 1,00 1,31
1930 1,88 4,75 7,61 10,47 0,58 0,27 0,14 0,14 1,09 1,30 1,08 1,44DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 39
Table A4
Tax Exports and Revenue: ratios of real to optimal, 1880-1930
Only if    0< TQ/T*Q* <1,09
Elast 1 Elast 2 Elast 3 Elast 4 Elast 1 Elast 2 Elast 3 Elast 4









1888 1,07 1,01 0,83 1,19
1889 1,03 1,02 0,92 1,30
1890 1,08 0,98 1,08 0,71 1,20 1,68
1891 1,01 1,18
1892 0,98 1,06 1,12 1,58
1893 1,00 1,04 1,00 1,44
1894 1,01 1,03 0,96 1,40
1895 0,99 1,06 1,06 1,54
1896 1,08 0,97 1,08 0,70 1,22 1,73
1897 1,06 0,97 1,07 0,72 1,20 1,68
1898 0,97 1,08 1,20 1,73
1899 1,04 0,97 0,79 1,39
1900 1,06 0,97 0,74 1,30
1901 0,98 1,05 1,09 1,52
1902 1,04 1,02 0,90 1,26
1903 1,04 1,02 0,88 1,26




1908 1,02 1,02 0,94 1,30
1909 0,98 1,05 1,11 1,56
1910 1,06 0,98 1,05 0,70 1,13 1,55
1911 0,98 1,04 1,07 1,49
1912 1,00 1,03 1,02 1,41
1913 1,09 0,99 1,03 0,66 1,04 1,43
1914 1,01 0,96 0,88 1,43
1915 1,06 0,97 1,74 2,84
1916 1,00 0,94 1,06 1,75
1917 1,03 0,96 1,03 0,71 1,18 1,65
1918 1,00 1,05
1919 1,00 0,92 1,06 0,97 1,58 2,19
1920 1,06 1,00 1,01 0,61 1,00 1,39
1921 1,01 0,94 1,04 0,81 1,32 1,84
1922 1,02 0,90 1,44 2,33
1923 1,00 0,92 1,11 1,82
1924 1,00 0,93 1,07 0,92 1,51 2,10
1925 1,01 0,93 1,20 1,96
1926 1,06 1,07 0,94 0,68 1,96 3,17
1927 1,03 1,02 1,43 5,87
1928 1,06 0,97 0,70 3,38
1929 1,00 1,00 1,01 4,52

































































































































































Source: Cariola y Sunkel (1982)DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 41
Graph A3













































































Source: Braun et.al. (2000).
Graph A4













































































Source: Derived from price and production statistics.  Braun et.al. (2000).42 EXPORT TARIFF, WELFARE AND PUBLIC FINANCE
Graph A5
Nitrate Production and Price : Standard deviation, 1880-1930






































































































































































































Source: Cariola y Sunkel (1982).DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 241 43
Graph A7
















































































Source: Chile. Ministerio de Hacienda: Antecedentes sobre la industria salitrera. Santiago, Universo, 1925
Chile. Ministerio de Hacienda: La Industria del Salitre de Chile. Santiago, La Nación, 1934
Graph A8
Effective Export Tax 1880-1930
(measured in units of 1880 tax level)
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Source: Table A1